RF Emitter Tracking and Intent Assessment by Kuhar, Benjamin J.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-21-2013
RF Emitter Tracking and Intent Assessment
Benjamin J. Kuhar
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kuhar, Benjamin J., "RF Emitter Tracking and Intent Assessment" (2013). Theses and Dissertations. 881.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/881
RF EMITTER TRACKING AND INTENT
ASSESSMENT
THESIS
Benjamin J. Kuhar, Captain, USAF
AFIT-ENG-13-M-29
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the United
States Government.
This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States.
AFIT-ENG-13-M-29
RF EMITTER TRACKING AND INTENT
ASSESSMENT
THESIS
Presented to the Faculty
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Electrical Engineering
Benjamin J. Kuhar, B.S. Cp.E.
Captain, USAF
March 2013
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED
AFH-ENG- 1 3-M-29 
Approved: 
RF EMITTER TRACK ING AND fNTENT 
ASSESSMENT 
Benjamin J. Kuhar. B.S. p.E. 
Captain. USAF 
Dr. R.K. Martin. PhD (Cha irman) 
Lt Co l J.D . Clark. PhD (Member) 
Mnj M.D. Silvius. PhD (Member) 
Date 
Date 
AFIT-ENG-13-M-29
Abstract
Current research in employing pattern recognition techniques in a wireless sensor
network (WSN) to detect anomalous or suspicious behavior is limited. The purpose of
this research was to determine the feasibility of an accurate tracking and intent assessment
system of unknown or foreign radio frequency (RF) emitters in close proximity to and
within military installations as a method for physical security.
22 position tracks were collected using a hand-held Global Positioning System (GPS)
unit and a training data set from five different features was generated for each position
track. Each collected position track was individually classified as suspicious or non-
suspicious by the leave-one-out-cross-validation (LOOCV) method using four different
classification methods. The four classification methods used in this research were the
linear discriminant function (LDF), the diagonal linear discriminant function (DLDF),
the quadratic discriminant function (QDF) and the Mahalanobis distance method. The
accuracies and false positive/negative error rates of the four classification methods were
compared for different assessment system configurations. Additionally, best fit receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves were generated for each classification method and
discussed.
The QDF classification method out-performed the other three classification methods.
This classification method achieved an accuracy of 95% when it classified the 22 position
tracks one at a time. The lowest false positive and false negative rates were 10% and 0%,
respectively. The prior probabilities for the non-suspicious and suspicious classes were
both set to 50% class for this configuration.
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RF EMITTER TRACKING AND INTENT
ASSESSMENT
I. Introduction
T his chapter introduces this research and provides a brief background on theincreasing prevalence of geolocation technologies to locate emitters. It includesthe problem statement, research objectives, limitations, equipment required,
and a section communicating the importance of this research to the Department of Defense
(DoD).
1.1 Background
Research in the area of locating and tracking Radio Frequency (RF) signal-emitting
sources has been conducted for the last six decades [1]. The process of determining
an unknown position of an emitter is called source localization or geolocation. The
capability to geolocate an emitting object is currently a critical requirement necessary
to perform certain missions of the United States (US) Military. The ability to determine
the precise location of US military personnel on the earth and navigate their movement
requires geolocation. Additionally, millions of dollars are invested each year into the
continuing research and advancement of Location Based Services (LBS) in the commercial
telecommunications sector. In 2010 there were 6,000 location-based applications for the
iPhone, 900 for the Android and 300 for the Blackberry [2].
An example of a commercial application that uses geolocation is navigation.
Currently, geolocation can be accomplished by both terrestrial-based (ground) and space-
based systems. Global Positioning System (GPS) is an example of a system used to
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geolocate objects in motion both on the surface of the earth and airborne. Both automobiles
and airplanes benefit from geolocation-aided navigation [3].
Geolocation is also employed in the military for locating and tracking both hostile
and foreign unknown targets. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are one method for
accomplishing this. WSNs can be used to determine the position or location of a foreign
emitter within the network. They are comprised of light-weight devices referred to as
sensor nodes. These multi-function nodes are designed to sense their environment, process
data and communicate with each other using radio waves [4]. Figure 1.1 is a diagram of
a typical WSN. The base station is the central communications focal point, receiving and
transmitting pertinent information from and to the sensor nodes.
Figure 1.1: A Typical WSN, used with permission [5].
With the addition of a geolocation method to record estimated foreign emitter
positions at certain time samples within the network, a real-time emitter tracking system
can be created. The tracking data produced by this system can be used to generate
feature data which is employed by a pattern recognition mechanism called a classifier.
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The classifier will use training data to determine if the emitter exhibits non-suspicious or
suspicious (anomalous) behavior.
The system described in the previous paragraph is an example of a tracking and intent
assessment system. A human can be placed in the assessment loop and is cued based on the
classifier’s decision that the position track is suspicious. Chapter II will explain in detail
different methods employed for geolocation. That chapter will also explain how WSNs can
also be used to detect anomalous behavior in the computer network or cyber domain in
addition to the physical domain that was discussed in this section.
1.2 Problem Statement
Current research in the area of employing pattern recognition techniques for detecting
suspicious or anomalous behavior within a sensor network is limited. The purpose of
this research was to determine the feasibility of an accurate intent assessment system of
unknown or foreign emitters for military installations as a method for physical security.
Another goal of this research effort was to create geolocated position tracks in real-time
using wireless sensors and an estimation algorithm. These position tracks were to be
employed as training data for the intent assessment system. However, due to hardware
issues with the sensors, a hand-held GPS unit was instead used create the position tracks.
1.3 Scope and Application
Latitude-Longitude (Lat-Long) position tracks were collected using a GPS unit inside
a pre-determined area within Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Area B. This data
collection area was 2,095 feet by 2,095 feet or 4,389,025 feet2 (about 100 acres). Google
Maps® was used to create an overhead satellite image for the data collect area. In addition,
this application was also used to create a reference point on the data collect area to convert
the position track data in Matrix Laboratory® (MATLAB) from Lat-Long coordinates to x-
y coordinate data. Feature data was generated for each position track in the database which
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was fed into a classifier. The classifier classified each position track as non-suspicious or
suspicious using the Leave-One-Out-Cross-Validation (LOOCV) method.
A considerable amount of time and effort was spent accomplishing certain tasks for
this research. Time was required to create position tracks with the GPS unit. Additionally,
an interface was created with the aid of Google Maps® to precisely plot the collected
position tracks on an overhead image and to convert image pixel distances into an
acceptable unit of measure (feet). A third task undertaken was to store all the position
tracks in a single matrix in MATLAB® to be efficiently passed into the feature generation
algorithms. These tasks are described in detail in chapter III.
1.4 Research Objectives
The main objective of this research was to determine if position tracks collected within
a WSN could be accurately classified as non-suspicious or suspicious. Additionally, a
secondary goal was to determine if accurate position tracks could be created from real-time
geolocated Received Signal Strength (RSS) data of an emitter in a WSN.
1.5 Assumptions
Certain limitations and assumptions were established for this research effort. First, the
emitter that was tracked inside the WSN could exist in a state of motion. Secondly, the
intent assessment system designed in this research could only locate and track one emitter
in real-time.
1.6 Equipment Used
A Magellan® Mobile Mapper GPS unit was used to collect the position tracks for
this research. Additionally, MATLAB® was used to process all the data pertaining to this
research and to generate the results. All of the MATLAB® code developed for this research
was original except for three functions. The first function imported data from the hand-held
GPS unit into MATLAB®. The second function converted Lat-Long coordinates to x-y
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coordinate data. A third function created landmark distance maps using landmark bitmap
images. These functions were written by a prior Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
student.
1.7 Motivation
Protecting the integrity of military installations is paramount to the ongoing operations
of the US Military. Breakthroughs in this research area would inevitably have a positive
impact on the security of both domestic and deployed military bases alike. The concept of
an automated intent assessment system poses multiple advantages to the military.
This system would reduce the required security manning associated with perimeter
surveillance by determining the intent of personnel approaching military installations [6].
By reducing the manning of security personnel, the operating costs required to keep the
installation at a normal operating level would decrease. The security personnel displaced
from the task of monitoring perimeter activity could be employed in some other fashion.
Additionally, the physical security infrastructure of the installation would improve
due to a precise, real-time tracking and intent assessment system installed to monitor all
RF emitter activity within close proximity to and inside the installation. Suspicious emitter
activity would be flagged so that security personnel could take the proper action.
1.8 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II presents a background on
geolocation and pattern recognition methods in the context of this research. Chapter III
explains the processes and methodologies used in this research. Chapter IV presents the
analytical results of this research. Finally, chapter V summarizes this thesis, provides a
conclusion and discusses areas of possible future research.
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II. Background
T his chapter introduces the theory and principles relevant to RF emitter trackingand intent assessments. The fundamental principles of source localization andpattern recognition are discussed as well as current research thrusts in the areas
of anomaly detection and pattern recognition in a WSN to aid in computer network security.
With the demand increase for heightened security both in the physical and cyber
domains, an emphasis has been placed on advancing research in the area of developing
sophisticated algorithms that detect and prevent intrusions [4]. Pattern recognition
techniques that detect anomalous events in WSNs are viable solutions for meeting this
demand. No existing literature was found on previous research attempts to determine the
feasibility of RF emitter tracking and intent assessment systems designed specifically to
improve a military installation’s security.
2.1 Source Localization
Geolocation or source localization is the process of estimating the position or location
of an RF transmitter. There are multiple ways to perform geolocation. Four common
geolocation methods are Time of Arrival (TOA), Time Distance of Arrival (TDOA), Angle
of Arrival (AOA) and RSS [7].
A conference paper introduced an RF geolocation and tracking system for the US
Navy. The paper communicated that the Navy requires accurate detecting, locating and
tracking of mobile RF emitters. The system design used Direction of Arrival (DOA)
(similar to AOA) as the geolocation method and proposed a Kalman filter for the tracking
mechanism [8]. This system did not perform intent assessments of the emitters.
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2.1.1 Time of Arrival
TOA is a localization technique that measures the absolute time at which a transmitted
signal first arrives at a receiver. If two receivers are in operation, TOA data will determine
the estimated transmitter position to be one of two equally probable points. If three
receivers are employed, a single, precise position estimate results through a process
called tri-lateration. This process involves determining the emitter position by using the
intersection of ranging circles. Figure 2.1 illustrates the tri-lateration process. A, B and C
are the sensors, X is the emitter, and rA,B,C are the radial distances from each sensor to X.
It is possible in certain cases that tri-lateration will produce more than one estimate for the
emitter. Multi-lateration employs at least four sensors and improves the accuracy of the
localization process [1].
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Figure 2.1: Tri-lateration TOA.
One requirement of TOA is that the internal clocks in all the devices (including
the transmitter) must be precisely synchronized. Given the high propagation speeds
of transmitted signals, very small discrepancies in time synchronization can result in
very large errors in location accuracy. TOA-based positioning solutions are typically
challenging in environments where large amounts of multi-path, interference, or noise may
exist. GPS is an example of a location system that uses TOA [1].
2.1.2 Time Distance of Arrival
TDOA uses relative time measurements instead of the absolute time measurements
that TOA employs. While all the receivers need to be precisely synchronized in TDOA,
it is not necessary for the transmitter to also be synchronized. Geolocation with TDOA
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is performed through a process called hyperbolic-lateration [1]. Figure 2.2 illustrates this
process.
Figure 2.2: Hyperbolic-lateration TDOA.
Hyperbolas are drawn for each sensor pair. First, the constant TDOA is calculated for
two sensors using Equation (2.1) [9]:
T DOAB−A = |TB − TA| = k, (2.1)
where T DOAB−A is the constant time difference between sensors A and B. It is calculated
using TA and TB: the emitter’s TOA to the two sensors respectively. The constant difference
in time between the emitting signal’s arrival to sensors A and B is k. The constant difference
in distance is then calculated using Equation (2.2) [9]:
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|DXB − DXA| = kc, (2.2)
where DXB and DXA are the constant differences from the emitter to each sensor,
respectively. The constant time difference k is multiplied to c, the speed of light (2.9 x
108 meters per second) in order to achieve units of meters. The hyperbola between the two
sensors is drawn using Equation (2.3) [9]:
√
(x − xA)2 + (y − yA)2 −
√
(x − xB)2 + (y − yB)2 = kc, (2.3)
where xA, yA, xB and yB are the x-y coordinate locations of the two sensors respectively.
The two variables in this equation are x and y which lie on the x-y coordinate plane and
represent all possible x-y coordinates of the hyperbola. The hyperbola’s foci are centered
at the locations of sensors A and B. This process is repeated for each hyperbola. The point
of intersection on the hyperbolas represents the estimated emitter position [9].
2.1.3 Angle of Arrival
AOA estimation uses a non-lateral approach to estimate the position of an emitter. It
is accomplished through a phased-array antenna at each sensor that estimates the direction
of the emitter’s signal. The antenna is comprised of a sensor array and a real-time adaptive
signal processor. The signal processor calculates and draws a Line-of-Bearing (LOB) for
each sensor. The estimated position of the emitter is where the LOBs intersect. This process
is called triangulation.
Only two receivers need to be employed to acquire a position estimate. Figures 2.3
and 2.4 convey how AOA is used to triangulate an emitter’s position using two and three
receivers, respectively.
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Figure 2.3: Triangulation using Two Receivers.
Figure 2.4: Triangulation using Three Receivers, used with permission [10].
The antennas in each sensor antenna array must be synchronized and require
processing time to calculate the phase differences of the received emitter signal. However,
no time synchronization is required between one AOA sensor and another. One application
of AOA is the processing of radar signals [1].
2.1.4 Received Signal Strength
Geolocation can also be accomplished through RSS, which is defined as the voltage
measured by a receiver’s Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI). In this geolocation
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method, sensors are arranged in a particular configuration in the network. Each sensor
records the transmitted signal’s RSS value in decibels (dBs), which is proportional to the
logarithm of the distance from the emitter to the sensor. The RSS sensors report this value
to a base station [1].
The base station collects the RSS values from all the sensors and inputs them into
a position estimator such as a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) [1]. A very noisy
position estimate can be determined with just three RSS sensors. As the number of RSS-
reporting sensors in the network increases, the accuracy of the position estimate also
increases.
RSS is a popular geolocation method because it is simple and inexpensive to
implement. It should be noted however, that as the number of sensors used in the
network increases, the cost to implement RSS geolocation increases. Additionally,
position estimates can be unpredictable and highly inaccurate due to the variability in RSS
measurements [1].
The task of geolocating an emitter on a military installation in real-time would require
many sensors to cover the large area. Since RSS sensors are inexpensive, RSS is the most
appropriate geolocation method for this research. In addition to being cheap, RSS sensors
are easy to work with; they only one measure one variable. TOA, TDOA and AOA sensors
are significantly more expensive than RSS sensors.
The particular configuration that RSS sensors are arranged in will affect the accuracy
of the estimator used to produce x-y position estimates of the emitter. Figure 2.5 displays
three different sensor configurations used for simulated RSS geolocation scenarios. An
MLE was used for each configuration to estimate the emitter positions. The results of
the three configurations were compared to determine which configuration yielded the best
accuracy.
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Figure 2.5: Example of Simulated RSS Geolocation Scenarios, used with permission [7].
The MLE was executed 1,000 times for each of the five emitters, generating 1,000
x-y position estimates for each emitter. Error ellipses for the Crame´r-Rao Lower Bound
(CRLB) and MLE were calculated and plotted for all five emitters for each sensor
configuration. The CRLB presents the lower bound (or minimum) of an unbiased
estimator’s covariance (σ2). In other words, the variance of an unbiased estimator must
be greater than or equal to this bound. An estimator that achieves the CRLB is considered
efficient. The MLE is a popular estimator and is unbiased. It is unbiased because on
average, the estimated position of the emitter is correct. Additionally, it is known to
consistently achieve the CRLB and has a Gaussian or normally-distributed Probability
Density Function (PDF) [11].
The CRLB Confidence Interval (CI) ellipse bounds the area that 95% of the estimated
emitter positions would reside in if the estimator used were as efficient as possible (if the
minimum variance were acheived). The MLE CI ellipse bounds the area in which 95% of
the estimated emitter positions actually resided in for the simulation. Figure 2.6 illustrates
the x-y position estimate simulation results for five emitters and the 95% CI CRLB and
MLE error ellipses for sensor configuration one. The MLE ellipse for emitter one was
exactly the same as the CRLB for that emitter. The MLE ellipses for emitters two, three
and four were slightly larger than the corresponding CRLB ellipses for those emitters.
The MLE ellipse for emitter five was not completely accurate because the estimates were
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confined by the search space. The search space effectively biased the estimator which
resulted in an MLE ellipse that appeared tighter than it actually was.
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Figure 2.6: Emitter Estimates and 95% CI CRLB/MLE Error Ellipses for Sensor
Configuration One [12].
Figure 2.7 illustrates the emitter estimates and error ellipses for sensor configuration
two’s simulation results. The MLE ellipses for emitters one, three and four extended
significantly in both the positive and negative x direction when compared to the CRLB
ellipse for those emitters. The MLE ellipses for emitter two was very simliar to the CRLB
ellipse. The MLE ellipse for emitter five was again biased by the search space. This
configuration was the least ideal because the variances of estimated positions of all five
emitters were high.
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Figure 2.7: Emitter Estimates and 95% CI CRLB/MLE Error Ellipses for Sensor
Configuration Two [12].
Figure 2.8 illustrates the emitter estimates and and error ellipses for sensor
configuration three. The MLE ellipses for emitters one, two, three and four were only
slightly larger in area than their CRLB ellipse counterparts. The estimates for emitters one,
three and four were very tight. The MLE ellipse for emitter four was also slightly biased by
the search space. The MLE ellipse for emitter five was significantly biased by the search
space.
Overall, sensor configuration three produced the tightest MLE ellipses for all five
emitters. Emitters one, three and four had very tight ellipses. Emitter four’s estimates
varied significantly and subsequently had the largest CRLB and MLE ellipses. The farther
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Figure 2.8: Emitter Estimates and 95% CI CRLB/MLE Error Ellipses for Sensor
Configuration Three [12].
out of the sensor network the true emitter locations were, the higher the variance was of the
estimates for those emitters.
This section presented a brief background on geolocation and four common
localization techniques. An explanation was given to support why RSS is the most
appropriate geolocation method for an RF emitter tracking and intent assessment. The
results of simulated RSS geolocation scenarios for three different sensor configurations
were presented and discussed. The next section will introduce the fundamentals of pattern
recognition and its applications for determining the intent of an emitter in a WSN.
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2.2 Pattern Recognition
Pattern recognition is an area of study in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) or machine
learning research field and has many applications for speech recognition, image analysis
and cognitive and computer science. Pattern recognition is the field of processing raw data
and assigning that data to a certain class, or category. The four main stages of a pattern
recognition system are: data collection, segmentation, feature generation, and classification
[13]. All four stages are defined in this section and an explanation is given concerning how
each stage applies to this research effort.
2.2.1 Data Collection
In the data collection (or sensing) stage, data from the subjects of interest are collected
and stored [13]. For this research, Lat-Long position tracks were collected using the GPS
unit. The position tracks were collected in real-time, and stored in a database used as
training data for the classifier. The intent assessment in this research was designed to
classify a position track as suspicious or non-suspicious in real-time.
2.2.2 Segmentation
In the segmentation stage, the collected data is differentiated from one subject to
another. The segmentation process can be challenging if there are unclear or unestablished
baselines to delineate one subject from another [13]. In this research, the intent assessment
was designed to classify only one position track in real-time.
2.2.3 Feature Generation
In this stage, distinguishing features are generated from the subject’s data set for
classification. If more than one feature is generated from a subject data set, a feature vector
is created for each subject [13]. In this research, five features were employed: dwell (or
loiter time), repetition, deviation from roads and parking lots, proximity to a high-valued
building, and proximity to a water tower. Subpixel detection was performed to determine
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which pixel in the overhead image a position track resided in for each time stamp. Chapter
III discusses the feature generation process for this research in detail.
2.2.4 Classification
The task of assigning an object to a class using the feature vector is defined as
classification. A classifier that assigns a sample into one of two classes is formally called
a dichotomizer but is more commonly known as a binary classifier [13]. A classifier that
assigns an object into more than two classes is called a polychotomizer [13]. The classifier
used in this research was a binary classifier because the class that each position track was
assigned to was either suspicious or non-suspicious.
The degree of difficulty in classifying objects to the correct class is directly
proportional to the variability of the feature generation data. The feature data for objects
that belong to the same class can be varied due to complexity and noise. Bayesian decision
theory is a common statistical process employed in pattern classification [13].
There are many pattern recognition methods for classifying subjects into classes.
The four classification methods used to classify position tracks as suspicious or non-
suspicious for this research were: the Linear Discriminant Function (LDF), the Diagonal
Linear Discriminant Function (DLDF), the Quadratic Discriminant Function (QDF) and the
Mahalanobis classification method. The next five subsubsections briefly describe certain
classification methods.
2.2.4.1 LDA
LDA (or Fisher’s Linear Discriminant) is a classification method that uses supervised
training to reduce an ‘n’ dimensional data set of a two-class classification problem to one
dimension [13]. Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) is an extension of LDA applied to
a multiple class problem. MDA reduces an ‘n’ dimensional data set to a C − 1 dimensional
data set where C is the number of classes [13].
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2.2.4.2 LDF
It was determined that MATLAB®’s classify function uses discriminant functions to
classify data. LDFs classify a data set by determining the optimal separating hyperplane.
Equation (2.4) is the general function of an LDF:
f (x) = wT x + w0, (2.4)
where w is the weight vector , x is the input vector (the data sample of an object to be
classified into a certain class) and w0 is the bias or threshold. The input vector x is classified
according to the conditional statements below:
x ∈ C1, if f (x) ≥ 0,
x ∈ C2, if f (x) < 0,
where C1 and C2 denote class one and two respectively. The hyperplane is a d − 1
dimensional surface, where d is the number of features of the data [13]. In this research, d
was five and was explained in subsection 2.2.3. The weight vector w is easily determined
by use of the matrix form of Equation (2.5) as [13]:
Xw = b, (2.5)
where X is the matrix of training data and b is an arbitrary user-defined vector.
Equation (2.6) shows (2.5) in expanded form.

x10 x11 · · · x1d
x20 x21 · · · x2d
...
...
. . .
...
xn0 xn1 · · · xnd


w0
w1
...
wd

=

b1
b2
...
bn

(2.6)
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In (2.6) [13], d is the number of features of the data and n is the number of samples included
in the training data set which was 22 for this research. There were 22 position tracks
included in the position track database. There are d + 1 columns in the training data matrix
(X) of (2.6).
In X, the samples are rows and the features are columns. The dimensions of X were 22
x 6 for this research. The dimension of w was 6 x 1 to include the bias (w0). The dimension
of b was 22 x 1. There are many possible solutions for b. One possible solution is that all
rows in the matrix are ones.
From (2.5), if X is non-singular (or invertible), X−1 can be multiplied to both sides of
the equation, as shown in Equation (2.7). Non-singular matrices have an inverse that exists
and can be calculated as [13] :
XX−1w = X−1b. (2.7)
Equation (2.8) can then be used to solve for w as [13] :
w = X−1b. (2.8)
However, X is typically singular (which means that the inverse of X does not exist) [13].
While X−1 cannot be solved directly, the hyperplane can still be determined. First, XT is
multiplied to both sides of the equation as shown in Equation (2.9) [13].
XT Xw = XT b (2.9)
Then, (XT X)−1 is multiplied to both sides of the equation as shown in Equation (2.10) [13].
(XT X)(XT X)−1w = (XT X)−1XT b (2.10)
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Equation (2.10) quickly simplifies because (XT X)−1 cancels the (XT X) on the left side of
the equation. Equation (2.11) is the resulting equation solved for w.
w = (XT X)−1XT︸        ︷︷        ︸
pseudoinverse
b (2.11)
The product (XT X)−1XT is called the pseudoinverse and is multiplied to b to determine w.
The bias (w0) of the LDF function can be calculated when the value of f (x) is 0. This is
demonstrated in Equation (2.12) [13].
0 = wT x + w0 (2.12)
Equation (2.13) is the result when w0 is subtracted from both sides and then division is
performed by ||w|| [13], which is the l2 norm of the hyperplane.
wT x
||w|| = −
w0
||w|| (2.13)
When w and w0 are determined, any input vector x can be classified into the appropriate
class using the discriminant function in (2.4) [13].
2.2.4.3 DLDF
The DLDF classification method is similar to the LDF method except that a diagonal
covariance matrix is developed. This matrix asserts that the five features used in this
research were independent. A classifier that has a diagonal covariance matrix is called
a naive bayes classifier [13].
2.2.4.4 QDF
QDF is simply an extension of the LDF but instead uses a quadratic function.
Equation (2.14) is the general form for the quadratic discriminant function.
f (x) = wT x2 + wT x + w0 (2.14)
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In the same manner as (2.4), w is the weight vector, x is the input vector and w0 is the bias.
2.2.4.5 Mahalanobis Method
The Mahalanobis method was the fourth classification method employed in this
research. It is fundamentally different than the previous three classification methods. This
method uses a distance metric to classify samples into classes. It makes use of the fact
that the direction of a data set’s variance plays an important role in classification [13]. For
example, the standard deviation of the distribution of data could resemble an ellipse, as
shown in Figure 2.9 [13].
Figure 2.9: Ellipse-shaped distribution of data represented by the standard deviation (σ) .
This method can identify outliers in the data set by accounting for the standard
deviation (σ) of the data [13]. In Figure 2.9, the blue star data-point has a greater euclidean
distance from the data’s mean (µ) than the red square; however, the red square data point
is outside the standard deviation (σ) of the data and thus can be considered an outlier.
Equation (2.15) is the general equation for the Mahalanobis method [13]:
DM(x) =
√
(x − µ)T S−1(x − µ), (2.15)
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where x is the multivariate input vector, µ is a vector of means, S is the covariance matrix
and DM(x) is the Mahalanobis distance vector for x. The MATLAB® documentation for the
classify function states that Mahalanobis distances are calculated with stratified covariance
estimates.
2.2.4.6 Classifier Terminology
The classifier will always classify an object into one of the classes defined by the
problem. In this research, a position track is always classified as either suspicious or non-
suspicious. If the classifier fails to classify the object into the correct class, a false positive
error (or Type I error) or a false negative error (Type II error) occurs [14]. These errors are
now explained in the context of this research. First, the suspicious class of position tracks
is now referred to as H1 and the non-suspicious class of position tracks is referred as H0.
A false positive error occurs when the classifier classifies a non-suspicious position track
as suspicious. In mathematical terms, H0 is classified as H1. A false positive error is also
called a ‘false alarm.’
Conversely, a false negative error occurs when the classifier incorrectly classifies a
suspicious position track as non-suspicious. In mathematical terms, H1 is classified as H0.
A false negative error is also called a ‘miss.’ The consequences of a false negative error
are more severe than a false positive error because security personnel would not engage
or investigate a suspicious track mis-classified as non-suspicious. A compromise of the
military installation could result.
The probability or rate that a false positive error or false alarm occurs is expressed
mathematically as PF and is defined as P[H1|H0]. This expression reads, “the probability
of H1 given H0.” It is the probability that the classifier selects a position track as suspicious
given that it was non-suspicious. The probability or rate that a false negative error or miss
occurs is expressed mathematically as PM and is defined as P[H0|H1]. This expression
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reads, “the probability of H0 given H1.” It is the probability that the classifier selects a
position track as non-suspicious given that it was suspicious.
When a classifier correctly classifies a suspicious track as suspicious it is referred to
as a ‘detect.’ The probability of detection is expressed as PD and is defined P[H1|H1]. PD
is inversely proportional to PM and is expressed in Equation (2.16).
PD = 1 − PM (2.16)
When a classifier correctly classifies a non-suspicious track as non-suspicious it is referred
to as a ‘reject.’ The probability of rejection is expressed as PR and is defined P[H0|H0]. PR
is inversely proportional to PF and is expressed in Equation (2.17).
PR = 1 − PF (2.17)
2.2.4.7 Reporting Methods
There are multiple methods to report the results of the classifier. The accuracy, PM
and PF can be graphed as a function of a sweeping parameter that is incremented from
one numeric value to another. The two parameters that were swept to generate classifier
statistics in this research were the grid cell width parameter (wcell) and the prior probability
of the suspicious class (P[H1]).
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves can be generated which display PD
vs. PF data. ROC curves communicate how well the classifier correctly classifies an object
that is a member of the class H1 into the H1 class, compared to how often it classifies an
object that is a member of the class H0 into the H1 class. Chapter IV presents the classifier
statistics for this research through the two parameter sweeps discussed in the previous
paragraph and PD vs. PF data which was used to generate best fit ROC curves.
This section presented the fundamentals of pattern recognition. The four main stages
of this field were defined and applied in the context of this research. In the classification
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subsection, the four classification methods employed in this research were introduced,
and equations were presented for them. Classifier terminology that is used in this thesis
was then discussed. Finally, the different ways of reporting the classifier statistics were
communicated. The next section will discuss the behavior classification process of an RF
emitter in a WSN.
2.3 Pattern Recognition Applied to WSNs
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, one solution to increasing the physical
security for a delineated area such as a military installation is to employ pattern recognition
techniques in WSNs to detect anomalous events. In section 1.1, it was explained that pattern
recognition techniques can be applied to geolocated position tracks produced by WSNs to
determine if an emitter in motion is malicious or not. This process is referred to as anomaly
detection or intent assessment. Anomaly detection is a subset of the behavior classification
field in which patterns are classified into two classes: suspicious (or malicious) and non-
suspicious [15]. Figure 2.10 illustrates the flow from collection of surveillance target data
in a sensor network to intent classification.
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Figure 2.10: Diagram of the Flow From a Physical Environment to Anomaly Detection,
used with permission [15].
By employing a geolocation method discussed in section 2.1 in real-time, an estimated
position track can be generated and recorded to classify the behavior. RF devices that
measure TOA, TDOA, AOA or RSS are examples of sensors that could be used in
this model. The five features generated were introduced in subsection 2.2.3: dwell (or
loiter time), repetition, deviation from roads and parking lots, proximity to a high-valued
building, and proximity to a water tower.
The modeling algorithms used in this research were the four classification methods
discussed in subsection 2.2.4: LDF, DLDF, QDF and the Mahalanobis method. The
learning method used in this research was supervised, because each position track in the
database was determined beforehand, during the data collection stage as non-suspicious
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or suspicious. Finally, the decision of normal or anomalous behavior at the end of the
flow chart is equivalent to the output of the intent assessment system in this research.
The decision terminology for the two classes in this research’s assessment system were
suspicious and non-suspicious.
This section presented a top-level view of the flow from passive surveillance of an
RF emitter in a WSN to an output decision that assessed the emitter’s intent. The next
section will discuss current research techniques in the area of applying pattern recognition
in WSNs to detect malicious activity in the cyber domain.
2.4 Pattern Recognition Applied to Cyber Security
Research into anomaly detection within a WSN is also being conducted in the
computer network domain as well as the physical domain. Pattern recognition techniques
can be employed in sensor networks to detect anomalous computer network activity. This
activity could result in a cyber or computer network-based attack. Neural Networks (NNs)
are one pattern recognition tool that can be used to detect cyber attacks [16]. NNs are
composed of interconnected neurons or nodes that are used to solve AI problems.
One example of a cyber attack is a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack [4].
DDoS attacks consist of a large number of network service requests towards a victim node.
A DDoS computer network attack can be realized in a WSN by attacking a target sensor
with the intent of exhausting the energy resources available to them. The targeted sensor
is then incapable of performing further sensing operations. Detection of DDoS attacks in a
WSN can be accomplished using a Graph Neuron (GN) NN [4]. The algorithm performs
comparisons of current network traffic patterns to a database of normal sensor network
traffic [4].
Electrical power grids and substations are examples of infrastructures that can be
highly vulnerable to cyber attacks [16]. Research has thus been conducted to specifically
prevent these kind of attacks. A cyber attack on a power substation could have the intent
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of disrupting or denying the power supply to commercial or residential areas. Figure 2.11
illustrates a Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) designed for detecting electrical faults
caused by cyber attacks in a power substation. A PNN is a type of NN called a feedforward
NN. In a feedfoward NN, information always flows forward through the network, as
opposed to forwards and backwards [16].
Figure 2.11: Architecture of a PNN Used for Detecting Authentic Faults in Power
Substations, used with permission [16].
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The input vector X ([x1 x2 x3]) is called the testing exemplar. The testing exemplar
elements x1, x2 and x3 are voltage readings taken from different locations in the substation.
PA and PB represent the probabilities of a real fault and fake fault, respectively. If
PA/(PA + PB) > 0.5, the exemplar data is classified into class A, or a real fault. If
PA/(PA + PB) < 0.5, the exemplar data is classified into class B (a fake fault). A fake
fault is a possible indication that a power substation’s fault protection system has been
compromised by a cyber attack [16].
In this section, DDoS attacks were defined and pattern recognition techniques that
use WSNs to detect malicious cyber activity were introduced. The top-level architecture
of a PNN designed to classify power substation data into real and fake faults was briefly
covered.
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter outlined principles of both source localization and pattern recognition.
Source localization was defined and the principles of TOA, TDOA and AOA were covered
briefly. Geolocation using RSS was discussed in greater and detail and the results of RSS
simulations of five emitters in three different sensor configurations using an MLE were
presented.
Pattern recognition was then defined and the four main stages of a pattern recognition
system were described in detail. Each stage was explained in the context of this research. In
the classification stage, equations were provided for the four classification methods used in
this research, with an emphasis on the LDF derivation. Additionally, classifier terminology
was introduced and methods of reporting classifier statistics were covered.
A brief overview was presented in the area of employing pattern recognition
techniques in a WSN to detect anomalous behavior in the physical domain. Finally, current
research that employs pattern recognition in WSNs to identify computer network (or cyber)
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attacks was discussed. Chapter III applies the theory that was presented in chapter II
towards the methodologies used in this research.
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III. Research Methodology
T his chapter describes the methodologies performed to collect and process x-yposition tracks using the Magellan® Mobilemapper GPS unit, generate featuresfrom the collected position tracks and process the generated feature data to
perform intent classification on a single position track in MATLAB®. A database was
created of position tracks collected from the GPS unit which was used by the classifier.
This database was comprised of position tracks intentionally created to replicate suspicious
and non-suspicious activity on a military installation. Figure 3.1 presents the specific GPS
unit used to collect the position tracks in this research.
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Figure 3.1: Magellan ® Mobile GPS Unit in Autonomous GPS Mode.
3.1 Magellan® GPS Unit Operation
The Magellan® GPS device user interface was straightforward and simple to operate.
When the unit was acquiring and maintaining communication with the GPS satellites,
it occasionally alternated between the autonomous and differential GPS modes. This
fluctuation was due to the variability of the GPS constellation’s signal strength in different
conditions. The GPS unit’s log functionality enabled real-time acquisition of Lat-Long
coordinates which were stored over time to create a position track. Each position track
recorded by the GPS unit was collected within the physical area displayed by Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Overhead Image of Position Track Collection Area.
This image is a section of Area B, WPAFB, and was captured using Google Maps®.
The dimensions of this image were 776 x 776 pixels. Google Maps® was also used to
convert the x and y axes from pixel units to feet. To accomplish this, two points at about
the same pixel row were picked on the overhead image plotted in MATLAB®. MATLAB®
was then used to zoom in on the two points and the distance between the two points in
pixels was counted and recorded. The distance scale in Google Maps® was then used to
measure the distance in feet from the same two points.
It was determined through dimensional analysis that one pixel had a distance of 2.7
feet. Since the dimensions of the overhead image were 776 x 776 pixels, the dimensions of
the image in feet were (776 * 2.7) x (776 * 2.7) or 2,095 feet x 2,095 feet. The imagesc
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command in MATLAB® was used to correctly scale the x and y axes. The next section
describes how the position tracks were imported into MATLAB® so feature generation
could be performed on them.
3.2 Position Track Processing
This section describes the process of importing the position tracks from the GPS unit
into MATLAB® and converting the Lat-Long coordinates into x-y coordinates for feature
generation.
3.2.1 Importing GPS Data into MATLAB®
Each position track text file was ported into a personal computer workstation through
a Universal Serial Bus (USB) connection. A function extracted the Lat-Long data from
the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) data format that was stored by the
GPS unit. The Lat-Long data was stored in a L x 2 matrix where L was the length or total
number of time-stamps of a particular track. The two columns encompassed the latitude
and longitudinal numeric values, respectively. A third column was added to the matrix that
stored the time-stamp for each Lat-Long entry. This column started with a numeric value
of one and was incremented by one to L (the last set of Lat-Long coordinates of a position
track had a time-stamp of L).
3.2.2 Lat-Long to x-y Coordinate Conversion
It was then necessary to convert the L x 3 time-stamp-Lat-Long matrix for each
position track to a matrix of x-y coordinates corresponding to the locations on the overhead
imagery map in Figure 3.2. A function converted each Lat-Long time-stamp to an x-y
coordinate pair. It was necessary to determine the Lat-Long coordinate pair of the bottom-
left corner of the overhead image acquired from Google Maps®. The origin of the overhead
image was at the bottom-left corner and had the x-y coordinates (0,0). The newly created
time-stamp-coordinate matrices also had the dimensions L x 3 for each position track. The
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first column of the matrix encompassed the individual time-stamp. The second and third
columns stored the x and y coordinate values respectively.
Figure 3.3 illustrates a processed position track that was collected using the GPS unit.
The track is green because it was collected with the intent of modeling non-suspicious
behavior.
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Figure 3.3: An Example Position Track Collected with the Magellan® GPS Unit.
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The 22 position tracks in the position track database were all processed before feature
generation on them was performed. The next section explains the five feature generation
algorithms that were performed on the position tracks.
3.3 Feature Generation
This section describes the processes employed to generate feature data from the
position track database. The five features used in this research were first introduced in
subsection 2.2.3 and are listed again: dwell (or loiter time), repetition, deviation from roads
and parking lots, proximity to a high-valued building, and proximity to a water-tower. The
dwell and repetition feature algorithms required the use of a variable resolution grid which
is discussed in subsection 3.3.1. The remaining three features belonged to a category of
features called landmark features. The algorithms for these features required a unique
landmark distance map. The development of the landmark distance maps is explained in
subsection 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Development of Grid
It was necessary to create a 2-dimensional grid in MATLAB® to generate data for the
dwell and repetition features. The grid itself was square in shape, and partitioned the 776
x 776 pixel overhead image into square-shaped cells of equal area. The resolution of the
grid could be adjusted, which altered the total number of cells within the grid. The grid
was used to keep track of which cell a position track resided in for a given time stamp. A
significant amount of book-keeping was required for this. Once the dwell and repetition
feature algorithms were able to determine which cell a position track was in, code could be
written to determine when a position track left the current cell and when (if ever) it returned
to the current cell and how many times. Figure 3.4 illustrates a grid configuration with a
grid cell width wcell of 81 feet.
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Figure 3.4: Variable Resolution Grid Developed for the Dwell and Repetition Features:
wcell = 81 feet.
Subsections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 will discuss how the grid designed for this research was
used to generate feature data for the dwell and repetition features.
3.3.2 Dwell
The first feature used to classify position tracks as suspicious or non-suspicious was
the dwell time (or loiter) feature. A numeric score for this feature was determined by
counting how many time stamps a certain position track remained in the same grid cell.
This was accomplished by traversing through position track starting at time-stamp one. The
x and y coordinates for each time-stamp were accessed and used to determine which exact
cell the position track was currently residing in. A local MATLAB® variable incremented
every time a position track remained in the same cell, as the next time-stamp was accessed.
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A segment of MATLAB® code is included to illustrate how the dwell algorithm was
implemented.
max_count = 0;
x_est = track(i,2); y_est = tracks(i,3);
% determine which cell the estimate is in
cell_x = ceil(x_est/grid_spacing);
cell_y = ceil(y_est/grid_spacing);
prev_x = cell_x; prev_y = cell_y;
for i = 2:length(track)
x_est = track(i,2); y_est = tracks(i,3);
% determine which cell the estimate is in
cell_x = ceil(x_est/grid_spacing);
cell_y = ceil(y_est/grid_spacing);
if cell_x == prev_x & cell_y == prev_y
% track stayed in the same cell
count = count + 1;
if count > max_count
max_count = count;
end
else % track moved to new cell
count = 0;
prev_x = cell_x; prev_y = cell_y;
end
end
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Figure 3.5 illustrates a collected position track that generated a low dwell feature score.
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Figure 3.5: Position Track with Low Dwell Time.
Figure 3.6 illustrates a collected position track that generated a high dwell feature
score. The track is red because it was collected with the intent of modeling suspicious
activity.
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Figure 3.6: Position Track with High Dwell Time.
This subsection described how the dwell time feature data was generated for the 22
position tracks. Procedural code was inserted to illustrate specifically how the algorithm
operated. Additionally, two position tracks were shown that had low and high dwell time
scores. The next subsection describes the development of the repetition feature algorithm.
3.3.3 Repetition
The repetition feature was employed to determine if a position track exhibited
repetitive activity within the data collect area. In the context of this research, repetition
was defined as the number of times a position track returned to the same grid cell. The
expression used to generate a score for repetitive position track behavior was:
N∑
c=1
n2c , (3.1)
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where N was the total number of grid cells in the current resolution configuration, c was
the current grid cell and nc was the number of times that a particular position track returned
to the current grid cell c during its collect. The exponent was a penalty factor and was set
to two for this research. Figure 3.7 illustrates a collected position track that exhibited low
repetitive activity.
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Figure 3.7: Position Track with Low Repetition.
Figure 3.8 illustrates a collected position track that exhibited high repetition.
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Figure 3.8: Position Track with High Repetition.
This subsection described how repetition feature data was generated for the 22 position
tracks. Equation (3.1) expressed the formula to calculate a repetition score for each position
track. Additionally, two position tracks were presented that had low and high repetition
scores. The next subsection describes the development of the landmark distance maps for
the three landmark features.
3.3.4 Development of Landmark Distance Maps
As stated in the beginning of this section, it was necessary to develop distance maps
in MATLAB® for the three landmark features used in this research effort. This was
accomplished by first creating a bitmap image that highlighted the areas of interest for each
landmark. The dimensions of the bitmap image were the same as the data collection area
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overhead image presented in Figure 3.2: 776 x 776 pixels. For the deviation from roads and
parking lots feature, pixels that encompassed either a road or parking lot were highlighted.
For the proximity to high-valued building and water tower features, the bitmaps highlighted
the pixels that encompassed these landmarks.
For the high-valued building and water tower bitmaps, it was relatively simple to
manually highlight the individual pixels that comprised those landmarks. However, the
task of highlighting all the areas in the overhead image that occupied road or parking lot
occupied proved to be a formidable task. The most efficient way this was accomplished
was by using MATLAB® to search the original overhead image for pixels that had the
same shading as pixels that were comprised of a road or parking lot. The deviation from
roads and parking lots bitmap was created this way. The three bitmaps created all had
dimensions of 776 x 776 pixels.
After the three bitmaps were created, the distance maps for the three landmark features
were created by a function in MATLAB®. This function inputted a 776 x 776 pixel
bitmap and returned a 776 x 776 pixel image for the given landmark feature. The function
searched the bitmap for the pixels that had values of zero. These pixels corresponded to
the highlighted areas of a given landmark feature. Then, pixels adjacent to the zero-valued
pixels were assigned a value of one because they were one pixel (or one unit of distance)
away from the landmark feature area.
Then, non-zero-valued pixels that were adjacent to the pixels that had values of one
were set to two because they were two pixels (or two units of distance) away from the
landmark feature area. This process continued until every pixel in the 776 x 776 map that
was not part of the highlighted area (and originally set to zero) was assigned a non-zero
value. In this way, a sophisticated landmark distance map was created for each of the three
landmark features used in this research.
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In the case of the roads and parking lots distance map, if a pixel was 200 units away
from a certain parking lot but only 100 units away from a road, the numeric value of 100
was stored to the pixel. The function that created the landmark distance maps ensured that
any pixel in the map that was not a member of the highlighted area was set to the minimum
distance away (or closest distance to) the nearest pixel belonging to the highlighted area.
This subsection explained how the landmark distance maps were created in MATLAB®.
The next three subsections describe the processes used to generate feature data using the
three landmark features. Figures of each landmark distance map that were used in this
research are presented.
3.3.5 Deviation from Roads and Parking Lots
This feature reported the maximum value that a position track deviated from either a
road or a parking lot within the confines of the overhead image. A local variable called
deviation was initialized to 0. The position track was then traversed, accessing the
x and y coordinates for each time-stamp. Each set of coordinates were mapped to the
corresponding pixel in the landmark pixel distance map that the position track resided in
at the particular time-stamp. Then, the pixel value for that pixel was accessed from the
distance map. If the pixel value was greater than the variable deviation, deviation was
set to the current pixel value. After the entire position track was traversed, the deviation
variable held the maximum deviation for that position track.
After deviation values for all position tracks were determined, the feature found the
greatest of the 22 maximum deviation values. All 22 maximum deviation values were
divided by this value to normalize the deviation scores for all position tracks between zero
and one. A segment of MATLAB® code is included to illustrate how this feature algorithm
was implemented.
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deviation= 0;
for i = 1:length(track)
x = floor(track(i,2));
y = floor(track(i,3));
current_value = roadParkingMap(y,x);
% x and y reversed flipped because of matrix form
if current_value > deviation
deviation = current_value;
end
end
Figure 3.9 presents the landmark distance map for this landmark feature.
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Figure 3.9: Deviation from Roads and Parking Lots Distance Map.
This figure shows the areas of the map that were roads and parking lots (dark blue-
colored areas), and also the areas that were not roads and parking lots. The pixels that have
significant distance from a road or parking lot were colored appropriately. Each pixel’s
value in the map represented the distance to the closest parking lot or road.
This subsection described how feature data from the roads and parking lots distance
map was generated for the 22 position tracks. The maximum deviation from a road or
parking lot within the confines of the overhead image was calculated for each position track
Each deviation value was divided by the maximum deviation of any track in the database to
scale all the deviation values from zero to one. The next subsection describes the process
used to generate feature data from the proximity to high-valued building landmark feature.
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3.3.6 Proximity to High-valued Building
This feature reported the nearest proximity of a position track to a particular building
in the overhead image. This building was located just north of the AFIT east parking lot at
the Lat-Long coordinates [39.783944N, 84.081043W]. Four satellite dishes were enclosed
behind a fence at the south-east corner of the building. The building was selected as a
high-valued building for the purpose of this research.
A local variable called maximumProximity was initialized to 60. The position track
was then traversed, accessing the x and y coordinates for each time-stamp. Each set of
coordinates were mapped to the corresponding pixel in the landmark pixel distance map
that the position track resided in at that particular time-stamp. Then, the pixel value
for that pixel was accessed from the distance map. If the pixel value was less than the
proximity variable, proximity was set to the current pixel value. After the entire position
track was traversed, the proximity variable held the closest proximity value to the high-
valued building for that position track.
After proximity values for all position tracks were determined, the algorithm found
the greatest of the 22 maximum deviation values. All 22 maximum deviation values were
divided by this value so that the now-scaled values were all real numbers between zero and
one. A segment of MATLAB® code is included to illustrate how this feature algorithm was
implemented.
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maximumProximity = 60;
for i = 1:length(track)
x = floor(track(i,2));
y = floor(track(i,3));
current_value = HighValuedBuildingMap(y,x);
% x and y reversed because of matrix form
if current_value < maximumProximity
proximity = current_value;
end
end
Figure 3.10 presents the landmark distance map for this landmark feature.
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Figure 3.10: Proximity to High-valued Building Distance Map.
This figure shows the area of the map where the high-valued building was located.
The maximum value that any pixel in the distance map contained was 60 feet. This
subsection described how feature data was generated for the proximity to a high-valued
building landmark feature. A score was calculated for each position track of the closest
proximity to the high-valued building. The next subsection describes the process used to
generate feature data from the proximity to the water tower landmark feature.
3.3.7 Proximity to Water Tower
This landmark feature reported the proximity to the water tower on Area B, with the
Lat-Long coordinates: [39.784517N, 84.080928W]. This water tower was considered high-
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valued for the purpose of this research. Any position track that came within close proximity
to it was flagged as suspicious.
A local variable called maximumProximity was initialized to 60. The position track
was then traversed, accessing the x and y coordinates for each time-stamp. Each set of
coordinates were mapped to the corresponding pixel in the landmark pixel distance map
that the position track resided in at that particular time-stamp. Then, the pixel value for that
pixel was accessed from the distance map. If the pixel value was less than the proximity
variable, proximity was set to the current pixel value. After the entire position track was
traversed, the proximity variable held the nearest proximity value to the water tower for
that position track. A segment of MATLAB® code is included to illustrate how this feature
algorithm was implemented.
maximumProximity = 60;
for i = 1:length(track)
x = floor(track(i,2));
y = floor(track(i,3));
current_value = waterTowerMap(y,x);
% x and y reversed because of matrix form
if current_value < maximumProximity
proximity = current_value;
end
end
Figure 3.11 presents the landmark distance map for this landmark feature.
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Figure 3.11: Proximity to Water Tower Distance Map.
This figure shows the area of the map where the water tower was located. The
maximum value that any pixel in the distance map contained was 60 feet. This subsection
described how feature data was generated for the proximity to water tower feature. A score
was calculated for each position track of the closest proximity to the water tower.
This section on described the processes employed to generate feature data from
the position track database. The first subsection described the development of the grid
necessary to calculate data using the dwell and repetition features. Then, the dwell and
repetition feature algorithms were explained. The development of the landmark distance
maps was then discussed. Finally, the three landmark features were described. The next
section describes how each position track was classified using the LOOCV method.
51
3.4 Classification of Position Tracks
This section details the process of individually classifying each collected position track in
the position track database using the LOOCV method. Each position track was classified
using the four classification methods introduced in chapter II. Before classification could
be performed, the feature generation data had to be converted into three matrices for the
classify function.
3.4.1 Pre-classification Data Processing
Before a position track could be classified as suspicious or non-suspicious, the
generated feature data needed to be processed into a format acceptable for the classify
function. First, the generated feature data was consolidated into a single matrix in
MATLAB®. This matrix had the dimensions of 22 x 5 (22 tracks and five features). Next,
this matrix was segregated into two matrices for each class (suspicious and non-suspicious).
The suspicious class matrix had the dimensions of 12 x 6 while the non-suspicious class
matrix had dimensions of 10 x 6. The additional column in these matrices stored the track
number of each position track for ease of error checking.
The two matrices grouped by class were then used to create the sample, training set
and group matrices required by MATLAB®’s classify function. The sample matrix
consisted of the particular position track to be classified as suspicious or non-suspicious
by the classify function. It was essentially a vector that consisted of the feature data
generated for the track to be classified. For this research, the dimension of the sample
matrix was always 1 x 5. While the classify function was able to classify more than
one position track simulatenously, position tracks were always classified one a time in this
research because the LOOCV method was employed.
The training data matrix consisted of the generated feature data for the other 21 tracks
that were not being classified. In this research, the dimensions of this matrix were always
21 x 5. The group matrix always had dimensions of 21 x 1 and was essentially a grouping
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vector for the training data matrix. It instructed the classify function which position tracks
in the training data matrix were pre-determined to be suspicious or non-suspicious.
The value in a particular row of the group matrix indicated the class of the track
corresponding to the same row in the training data matrix. If a certain position track was
suspicious, a zero was assigned to that track’s corresponding row in the group matrix. If
a position track was designed to be non-suspicious, the value in the group vector was set
to one. For example, if a certain track in the fourth row of the training data matrix was
designed to be a suspicious track, the fourth row of the group matrix was set to zero.
Code was written in MATLAB® to consolidate the generated feature data for the 22
position tracks into one matrix, create the two matrices separated by class and finally
populate the sample, training data and group matrices required for the classify function.
Figure 3.12 illustrates example sample, training data and group matrices used in this
research. The first value in the sample matrix indicates track nine was the position track
that was classified. The first column in the training data matrix displays the position track
numbers. This column was inserted for error checking and was not passed into the classify
function. Columns two through six in this matrix display the generated feature data for the
position tracks in the following order: dwell, repetition, deviation from roads and parking
lots, proximity to the high-valued building and proximity to the water tower.
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Figure 3.12: Example of Sample, Training Data and Group Matrices in MATLAB®.
After the sample, training set and group matrices were generated in MATLAB®,
classification of a single position track using the four different classification methods could
then be accomplished.
3.4.2 Classification in MATLAB®
Position tracks were classified as suspicious or non-suspicious with MATLAB®’s
classify function using the sample, training set and group matrices described in
subsection 3.4.1. Each position track in the database was classified four times using the
LOOCV method by the four classification methods discussed in chapter II. The classify
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function always returned either a zero or one for each of the four classification methods
since the intent classifier in this research was a two class scenario.
If a zero was returned, the position track in the sample matrix was classified as
suspicious. Conversely, the position track in the sample matrix was classified as non-
suspicious if a one was returned. After a position track was classified as suspicious or
non-suspicious, the results were stored for statistical processing of the four classification
methods. Chapter IV will discuss the results of the four classification methods.
This section explained the process performed to individually classify each collection
position track in the position track database using the LOOCV method. Each position
track was classified using the four classification methods introduced in chapter II.
Subsection 3.4.1 explained how the generated feature data was organized into the sample,
training data and group matrices needed for classification. Subsection 3.4.2 communicated
how classification of the position tracks was performed in MATLAB®.
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the processes and methodologies that were performed to collect
and process x-y position tracks using the Magellan® Mobilemapper GPS unit, generate
features from the collected position tracks and then process the generated feature data to
perform intent classification on a single position track in MATLAB®.
Chapter IV will discuss the feature generation and classification results produced in
this research using the methodologies that were described in this chapter.
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IV. Results and Analysis
T his chapter discusses the feature generation and classification results producedin this research using the methodologies described in chapter III. A detailedanalysis of these results is performed. Each position track in the database
was individually classified using the LOOCV method by the four classification methods
discussed in chapter II. Cross-sectional feature generation data plots that include
discriminant lines and curves from the four classification methods are presented and
discussed in section 4.1. The classifier statistics and results are presented and analyzed
in section 4.2.
4.1 Feature Generation Results
Cross-sectional feature generation figures are presented and explained in this section.
Figure 4.1 shows a cross-sectional plot of the dwell time vs. repetition feature generated
feature data. 162 foot grid cell spacing was chosen for this figure because it allowed for the
greatest separation between suspicious and non-suspicious tracks. The four discriminant
function lines and curves from the four classification methods discussed in chapter II are
also shown.
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Figure 4.1: Dwell Time vs. Repetition: wcell = 162 feet, Classified Track = 9.
The red upside-down triangle was the position track that was classified. Track nine was
the position track that was classified for all of the two dimensional cross-sectional plots in
this section. The green circles and red x’s represent the non-suspicious and suspicious
position tracks used as training data for the classifier, respectively. The discriminant
function lines and curves display the decision boundary areas for each classification
method. A boundary area labeled as H0 indicates the area that the particular classification
method would classify a position track as non-suspicious. Likewise, a boundary area
labeled as H1 indicates the area that the particular classification method would classify
a position track as suspicious.
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The position and shape of the discriminant function lines and curves depended on
the track that was classified as suspicious or non-suspicious because the training data used
as an input into the classifier would change. Feature data from only the dwell time and
repetition features were used by the classifier in Figure 4.1. All four methods correctly
classified track nine as suspicious. P[H0] and P[H1] were both set to 0.5 in MATLAB®
when the classify function was executed. All position tracks that had a repetition score
of about 0.1 and greater were suspicious, while some non-suspicious position tracks had a
dwell time score as high as 0.5.
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Figure 4.2: Deviation from Roads and Parking Lots vs. Repetition: wcell = 162 feet,
Classified Track = 9.
Figure 4.2 shows a cross-sectional plot of the deviation from roads and parking lots
vs. repetition generated feature data. Again, the red upside-down triangle represented
track nine and was the position track that was classified. Feature data from only the
deviation from roads and parking lots and repetition features were used by the classifier.
All four classification methods correctly classified track nine as suspicious. P[H0] and
P[H1] were both set to 0.5 in MATLAB® when the classify function was executed. 162
foot grid cell spacing was again chosen for this figure because it allowed for the greatest
separation between suspicious and non-suspicious tracks. While all position tracks that had
a repetition score of about 0.1 and greater were suspicious, some non-suspicious position
tracks had a deviation from roads and parking lots score as high as 0.9.
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Figure 4.3: Proximity to Water Tower vs. Dwell Time: wcell = 162 feet, Classified Track =
9.
Figure 4.3 shows a cross-sectional plot of the proximity to the water tower vs. dwell
time generated feature data. Track nine was the position track that was classified. Feature
data from only the dwell time and proximity to water tower were used by the classifier. The
LDF, DLDF and Mahalanobis methods correctly classified track nine as suspicious, while
the QDF method incorrectly classified it as non-suspicious.
One possible reason why the QDF curve was pulled to the right in this figure was
because track 16 had a dwell score of 0.5 but was collected with the intent of being non-
suspicious. If this position track were not included in the training data, the QDF method
may have correctly classified track nine as suspicious. 162 foot grid cell spacing was again
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chosen for this figure because it allowed for the greatest separation between suspicious and
non-suspicious tracks.
Figure 4.4 shows a cross-sectional plot of the proximity to the high-valued building
vs. repetition generated feature data. Track nine was the position track that was classified.
Feature data from only the repetition and proximity to high-valued building features were
used by the classifier. All four classification methods correctly classified track nine as
suspicious. 162 foot grid cell spacing was again chosen for this figure because it allowed
for the greatest separation between suspicious and non-suspicious tracks. While all position
tracks that had a repetition score of about 0.1 and greater were suspicious, some non-
suspicious position tracks had a proximity to the high-valued building score as high as
almost 0.7.
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Figure 4.4: Proximity to High-Valued Building vs. Repetition: wcell = 162 feet, Classified
Track = 9.
Four cross-sectional feature generation data plots that included discriminant function
lines and curves from the four different classification methods were presented and discussed
in this section. These figures verified the functionality of the five feature generation
algorithms. Additionally, it was shown that the discriminant function lines and curves
for the four classification methods varied appropriately depending on which position track
in the database was classified. The next section presents the classifier results and statistics.
4.2 Classifier Results
This section communicates the quantitative results of the classifier employed in this
intent assessment system. Subsection 4.2.1 presents and analyzes the results generated
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from a sweep of the grid resolution parameter, wcell. In subsection 4.2.2, results from a
sweep of the prior probability of the suspicious class (P[H1]) are presented and discussed.
Finally, subsection 4.2.3 presents PD vs. PF data for each classification method and the
corresponding best fit ROC curves.
4.2.1 Grid Resolution Sweep Results
In this subsection, a sweep of the grid cell dimension parameter wcell (in feet) was
performed on the classifier and the results are presented and analyzed. This parameter
changed the resolution of the grid which affected the data generated by the dwell and
repetition features.
The classifier performance and behavior varied as wcell changed because the dwell and
repetition feature generation data depended on the grid resolution. The grid cell spacing
parameter wcell was incremented from 2.7 feet (or 1 image pixel unit) to 1,026 feet (380
image pixel units). The maximum value for wcell did not exceed 1,026 feet because at that
grid resolution there were only four grid cells. If wcell were set to a longer cell dimension,
the entire 2,095 feet x 2,095 feet grid would have been only one cell. The dwell and
repetition algorithms would have failed to produce accurate feature data.
The parameter sweep comprised of 22 different wcell values. The classifier classified
each position track in the database for each different wcell value, using the four classification
methods. The prior probability values P[H0] and P[H1] for the non-suspicious and
suspicious classes respectively were both set to 0.5 in MATLAB® for the entire sweep.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the overall accuracy of the classifier for the grid resolution sweep.
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Figure 4.5: Overall Classifier Accuracy for Grid Resolution Sweep.
On average, the QDF classification method outperformed the other three classification
methods in terms of overall accuracy. The definition of accuracy in the context of this
research was the rate at which the classifier correctly classified a position track from
the database as non-suspicious or suspicious, using the LOOCV method. The average
performance for the QDF method over the entire grid resolution spectrum was 74.14%.
The Mahalanobis classification method performed the worst of the four classification
methods. The average performance of the Mahalanobis method for the grid resolution
sweep was 58.26%. While the Mahalanobis classification method had the worst average
accuracy, it still performed (only slightly) better than the random guess accuracy rate
(50%).
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A classification method that randomly classifies a position track as suspicious or non-
suspicious is accurate about 50% of the time. Therefore, a classification method with a
defined algorithm for classifying data that has an accurate rate of less than 50% is no better
than the random guess method.
The best accuracy for the entire plot was performed by the QDF classification method
when wcell was 270 feet. The QDF accuracy for that wcell value was 95.45%. The worst
accuracy displayed in the plot was performed by the LDF classification method when wcell
was 756 feet. The LDF accuracy for that wcell value was 36.36%. If a military installation
were picking a classification method solely based on maximizing the classifier accuracy,
the QDF method should be selected, with wcell set to 270 feet.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present confusion matrices using all five features for the four
classification methods for the grid resolution sweep. These matrices present the classifier
statistics when wcell was set to 270 feet. The rows of the confusion matrices indicate the
actual classes that the position tracks belonged to and the columns indicate the classes that
the classification methods assigned each position track as.
LDF DLDF
Non-suspicious Suspicious Non-suspicious Suspicious
Non-suspicious 8 2 7 3
Suspicious 3 9 4 8
Table 4.1: Confusion Matrix for LDF and DLDF Methods: wcell = 270 feet.
The matrices display the number of position tracks in the database that were correctly
classified into each class, and the number of tracks that were incorrectly classified into
each class. The LDF classification method correctly classified eight non-suspicious tracks
in the database as non-suspicious. Two non-suspicious tracks were incorrectly classified as
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suspicious. Three suspicious tracks were incorrectly classified as non-suspicious and nine
suspicious tracks were correctly classified as suspicious.
The DLDF classification method correctly classified seven non-suspicious tracks in
the database as non-suspicious. Three non-suspicious tracks were incorrectly classified as
suspicious. Four suspicious tracks were incorrectly classified as non-suspicious and eight
suspicious tracks were correctly classified as suspicious.
QDF Mahalanobis
Non-suspicious Suspicious Non-suspicious Suspicious
Non-suspicious 9 1 5 5
Suspicious 0 12 0 12
Table 4.2: Confusion Matrix for QDF and Mahalanobis Methods: wcell = 270 feet.
The QDF classification method correctly classified nine non-suspicious tracks in
the database as non-suspicious. One non-suspicious track was incorrectly classified as
suspicious. No suspicious tracks were incorrectly classified as non-suspicious and all 12
suspicious tracks were correctly classified as suspicious.
The Mahalanobis classification method correctly classified five non-suspicious tracks
as non-suspicious. The other five non-suspicious tracks were incorrectly classified as
suspicious. No suspicious tracks were incorrectly classified as non-suspicious and all 12
suspicious tracks were correctly classified as suspicious.
The false negative error statistic PM vs. wcell and the false positive error statistic PF
vs. wcell performances are now presented for the grid resolution sweep. Figure 4.6 presents
the false negative error statistic PM of the classifier as function of wcell.
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Figure 4.6: PM Performance for Grid Resolution Sweep.
PM was defined mathematically as P[H0|H1] (H0 picked when H1 was true) and
was the ratio of position tracks incorrectly classified as non-suspicious compared to the
total number of suspicious tracks in the database. It was the likelihood that the classifier
missed a suspicious track and classified it as non-suspicious. This metric was potentially
more important to security personnel than the overall classifier accuracy because the
consequences of mis-classifying a suspicious position track as non-suspicious were severe.
A hostile intruder could comprise an installation’s security without its activity being flagged
as suspicious.
On average, the Mahalanobis classification had the lowest PM rate: 3.03%. The
LDF and DLDF classification methods had the worst PM rates at 48.86% and 49.24%
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respectively. The Mahalanobis classification method yielded a PM of 0% 14 out of the
22 different wcell values, or more often than not. The QDF classification method had an
average PM of 13.64%. This classification method also yielded a PM of 0% five out of the
22 different wcell values. When wcell was set to 270 feet, the QDF classification method had
a PM of 0%.
If a military installation were choosing a single classification method solely based on
minimizing PM, the Mahalanobis method should be selected. Figure 4.7 presents the false
positive error rate PF of the classifier as a function of wcell.
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Figure 4.7: PF Classifier Performance for Grid Resolution Sweep.
PF was defined mathematically as P[H1|H0] (H1 picked when H0 was true) and was
the ratio of position tracks incorrectly classified as suspicious compared to the total number
of non-suspicious tracks in the database. It was the likelihood that the classifier incorrectly
classified a non-suspicious track as suspicious. The consequences of mis-classifying a
non-suspicious position track as suspicious were not as severe as incorrectly classifying a
suspicious track as non-suspicious.
In the event that a non-suspicious position track was classified as suspicious, security
personnel would be dispatched to investigate the emitting object. The act of dispatching
personnel to investigate the emitter would expend resources in various forms such as man-
hours. The cost of missing a suspicious track and subsequently not engaging it as described
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earlier in this subsection outweighs the cost of expending these resources to investigate the
uncertain intent of an emitter that was non-suspicious.
On average, the LDF classification method had the lowest PF rate: 11.82%.
The DLDF classification method had the second lowest PF rate: 13.18%. The QDF
classification method had the worst PF rate: 40.45%. The LDF classification method
yielded a PF of 0% nine out of the 22 different wcell values. This classification method
had a PF of 0% for 41% of the resolution sweep. When wcell was set to 270 feet, the QDF
classification method had a PF of 10.00%. 10.00% was the lowest PF probability that the
QDF method achieved for the grid resolution sweep.
If a military installation were picking a single classification method solely based on
minimizing PF , the LDF method should be selected. The quantitative results for the grid
resolution sweep are summarized in Table 4.3.
Statistics LDF DLDF QDF Mahalanobis
Average Accuracy (%) 67.98 67.15 74.17 58.26
Standard Deviation of Accuracy (%) 10.63 10.58 8.58 6.82
Average PM (%) 48.86 49.24 13.64 3.03
PM Standard Deviation (%) 11.87 12.04 10.46 4.10
Average PF (%) 11.82 13.18 40.45 88.18
PF Standard Deviation (%) 14.02 13.59 11.33 13.68
Table 4.3: Summary of Classifier Statistics for Grid Resolution Sweep.
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This subsection communicated the results of the grid resolution sweep. The grid cell
spacing parameter wcell was incremented from 2.7 feet (or 1 image pixel unit) to 1,026 feet
(380 image pixel units). The overall classifier accuracy, PM and PF were displayed as a
function of wcell. The figures were analyzed and recommendations were made concerning
which classification method was the most appropriate in terms of the three statistics. The
QDF classification method had the best overall accuracy of the four classification methods.
The Mahalanobis classification method had the lowest average PM rate and the LDF method
had the lowest average PF rate. In the next subsection, the results generated from parameter
sweeps of the suspicious class prior probability P[H1] are presented and analyzed.
4.2.2 Prior Probability Sweep Results
In this subsection, a second parameter sweep was performed and the results were
observed. The prior probability of the suspicious class P[H1] was incremented from 0.5 to
0.9 in 0.05 increments while the grid cell spacing parameter wcell was kept constant. The
P[H1] value instructed the classifier of the likelihood that a position track was suspicious.
The P[H1] sweep started at 0.5 and was increased from that value because it was not
appropriate in the context of the intent assessment in this research to have a P[H1] value
less than 0.5. A P[H1] value less than 0.5 meant that the likelihood of a suspicious track
occurring was less than 50%, or half the time.
If the classifier was instructed that the likelihood of a suspicious track occurring was
less than 50%, it was more likely to classify a track as non-suspicious. Consequently, the
PM rate would increase which would have adverse effects for a military installation (as
discussed in subsection 4.2.1). As P[H1] was incremented from 0.5 to 0.9, P[H0] was
decremented from 0.5 to 0.1. The sum of P[H1] and P[H0] always added to one. P[H0]
was the prior probability of the non-suspicious class and likewise instructed the classifier
of the likelihood that a position track was non-suspicious.
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The P[H1] sweep was performed to observe the classifier’s overall accuracy, PM and
PF probabilities as P[H1] increased. As P[H1] increased, it was expected that PM would
decrease and PF would increase. PM would decrease as P[H1] increases because the
classifier would be more sensitive to suspicious tracks and was more likely to classify a
track as suspicious. The number of suspicious position tracks incorrectly classified as non-
suspicious would decrease. Likewise, PF would increase as P[H1] was increased because
the number of non-suspicious tracks classified as suspicious would increase. The classifier
was more sensitive to suspicious tracks and was more likely to classify a track as suspicious.
The classifier classified each position track in the database for each different P[H1]
value using the four classification methods. The results of two P[H1] sweeps conducted for
two different wcell values are presented here. The wcell values chosen for this subsection’s
results were 270 and 918 feet. wcell was set to 270 feet for the first P[H1] sweep because
the highest accuracy for the QDF classification method (95.45%) occurred at this grid cell
width value. Therefore, a P[H1] sweep with this wcell value would theoretically yield the
best classifier results. wcell was set to 918 feet for the second P[H1] sweep so the first sweep
results were compared to a P[H1] sweep with wcell set to a value in the top tenth of the grid
resolution spectrum.
The classifier’s overall accuracy, PM and PF rates vs. P[H1] are presented for each
P[H1] sweep. Figure 4.8 presents the overall accuracy of the classifier for a sweep of
P[H1] when wcell was set to 270 feet.
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Figure 4.8: Classifier Accuracy for P[H1] Sweep: wcell = 270 feet.
The QDF classification method was the most accurate of the four classification
methods for the entire sweep of P[H1] when wcell was set to 270 feet. The average
performance for the QDF method for this sweep was was 89.90%. As P[H1] increased,
the accuracy of the QDF classification method gradually decreased, and never increased.
The best accuracy for the QDF method was 95.45% and occurred when P[H1] was 0.5
and 0.55. The QDF’s accuracy standard deviation for the P[H1] sweep was 4.97%. This
method’s accuracy varied less for this sweep when compared to the method’s accuracy for
the grid resolution sweep that had a standard deviation of 8.58%.
The accuracy for the Mahalanobis method remained constant at 77.27%. The accuracy
for the LDF classification method increased slightly at first and then decreased slightly as
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P[H1] increased. Finally, the DLDF classificiation method’s accuracy decreased slightly
when P[H1] was 0.6 and then increased to 72.76% when P[H1] was 0.85. All four
classification method’s accuracies varied less in this P[H1] sweep when wcell was set to
270 feet compared to the classification method’s accuracies for the grid resolution sweep.
Figure 4.9 presents the false negative error rate PM of the classifier as a function of
P[H1] for the four classification methods. wcell was set to 270 feet.
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Figure 4.9: PM Performance for P[H1] Sweep: wcell = 270 feet.
The QDF and Mahalanobis classification methods had PM values of 0% for the entire
sweep. This means that there were no false negative errors for these two methods. The
classification methods correctly classified all suspicious tracks as suspicious. This was
ideal because as stated in subsection 4.2.1, the consequences of mis-classifying a suspicious
position track as non-suspicious were severe.
The DLDF classification method started with a PM value of 33% when P[H1] was 0.5.
As P[H1] increased, PM for this method decreased, leveled once at 25% and then decreased
to 0% for P[H1] values of 0.85 and 0.9. Finally, the LDF classification method had a PM
value of 25% at the start of the sweep when P[H1] was 0.5. As P[H1] increased, the PM for
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this method decreased linearly to 8.3% when P[H1] was 0.6, and remained at 8.3% for the
rest of the sweep.
The standard deviation of the PM values for the LDF, QDF and Mahalanobis
classification methods for this P[H1] sweep were less than the standard deviation of the
PM values for the same classification methods for the grid resolution sweep. The DLDF
classification method’s PM standard deviation for the P[H1] sweep was greater than the
method’s corresponding standard deviation for the grid resolution sweep.
It was expected that as P[H1] approached 0.9 during the sweep that the PM rates for
all classification methods would approach 0%. As P[H1] increased, the classifier became
more sensitive to suspicious tracks and was more likely to classify a position track as
suspicious. It was shown in this figure that the number of false negative errors decreased
for the DLDF and LDF classification methods as P[H1] increased. As stated earlier, the
QDF and Mahalanobis classification methods both had PM rates of 0% during the entire
sweep of P[H1]. The LDF method never achieved a PM of 0%. The QDF and Mahalanobis
classification methods had the best overall PM rates (0%) for the P[H1] sweep when wcell
was 270 feet.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the false positive error rates PF of the four classification
methods for the P[H1] sweep. wcell was set to 270 feet.
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Figure 4.10: PF Performance for P[H1] Sweep: wcell = 270 feet.
The QDF classification method had the lowest average PF value: 22.22%. The method
had a PF value of 10% at the beginning of the sweep. The PF rate then increased to 20%
and leveled until P[H1] was 0.8. The PF value then increased to 40% at the end of the
sweep. The ideal P[H1] value for this method was 0.5. When P[H1] was 0.5, the QDF
method had no false negative errors (Figure 4.9), and only 10% false positive errors.
The LDF classification method had the second-best average PF rate: 33.33%. The
method had a PF value of 20% at the beginning of the sweep. The PF rate then increased
linearly to 40% and leveled until P[H1] was 0.85. The PF value then increased to 50% at
the end of the sweep. The ideal P[H1] value for this method was 0.6. When P[H1] was
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0.6, the LDF method incorrectly classified 10% of the suspicious tracks as non-suspicious
(Figure 4.9), and incorrectly classified 20% of the non-suspicious tracks as suspicious.
The Mahalanobis and DLDF classification methods had the worst average PF rates:
50%. The Mahalanobis method remained at 50% for the entire sweep. It consistently
classified half of the non-suspicious tracks in the database as suspicious during the sweep.
The DLDF method had PF value of 30% at the start of the sweep. As P[H1] increased,
PF for this method gradually climbed in a stair-step manner until P[H1] was 0.85. The PF
value then increased from 60% to 90% when P[H1] inceased from 0.85 to 0.9.
It was expected that the PF rates for all classification methods would increase as P[H1]
approached 0.9 during the sweep. As P[H1] increased, the classifier became more sensitive
to suspicious tracks and was more likely to classify any position track as suspicious. It
was shown in Figure 4.10 that the number of false positive errors increased for all of the
classification methods as P[H1] increased except the Mahalanobis method. The quantitative
results for the this P[H1] sweep with wcell set to 270 feet are summarized in Table 4.4.
Statistics LDF DLDF QDF Mahalanobis
Average Accuracy (%) 78.79 65.66 89.90 77.27
Standard Deviation of Accuracy (%) 3.94 4.01 4.97 0
Average PM (%) 11.11 21.30 0 0
PM Standard Deviation (%) 5.89 14.50 0 0
Average PF (%) 33.33 50.00 22.22 50.00
PF Standard Deviation (%) 11.18 18.71 10.93 0
Table 4.4: Classifier Statistics for P[H1] Sweep: wcell = 270 feet.
A P[H1] sweep was conducted with wcell set to 270 feet. The overall accuracy, PM and
PF rates vs. P[H1] were presented and analyzed for this sweep. A second P[H1] sweep was
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conducted with wcell set to 918 feet. The overall accuracy, PM and PF rates vs. P[H1] are
now presented for this sweep. Figure 4.11 illustrates the overall accuracy of the classifier
for this second P[H1] sweep with wcell set to 918 feet.
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Figure 4.11: Classifier Accuracy for P[H1] Sweep: wcell = 918 feet.
The QDF classification method again had the highest overall accuracy for this sweep.
However, all four classification method’s average accuracies were lower in this P[H1]
sweep than the average accuracies in the previous sweep when wcell was set to 270 feet.
The average accuracy for the QDF method for this sweep was was 71.21%. The QDF
method had an accuracy of 72.73% at the start of the sweep. It remained at 72.73% until
P[H1] was 0.75. At that point it decreased to and remained at 68.18% for the remainder of
the sweep.
The standard deviation of the QDF classification method’s accuracy for this sweep was
2.27%. This method’s accuracy varied less for this sweep when compared to the accuracy
for the grid resolution sweep that had a standard deviation of 8.58%.
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The accuracy for the Mahalanobis method remained constant at 50.00%. The accuracy
for the LDF classification method fluctuated at first and started descending to 36.36% when
P[H1] was 0.6. Finally, the DLDF method’s accuracy first increased slightly to 72.73% and
then gradually decreased to 50.00% when P[H1] was 0.55.
Figure 4.12 presents the false negative error rate PM of the classifier as a function of
P[H1] for the four classification methods. wcell was set to 918 feet.
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Figure 4.12: PM Performance for P[H1] Sweep: wcell = 918 feet.
The Mahalanobis classification method had the best average PM rate: 8.33%. It
remained at this value for the entire sweep. The QDF classification method had the second-
best average PM rate: 25.00%. It remained at this value for the entire sweep. The DLDF
classification method had a PM value of 60% at the beginning of the sweep and decreased
to 10% as P[H1] increased. Finally, the LDF method had a PM value of 50% when P[H1]
was 0.5. As P[H1] increased, the PM rate for this method decreased to 30%.
It was again expected that as P[H1] approached 0.9 during the sweep that the PM
rates for all classification methods would approach 0%. As P[H1] increased, the classifier
became more sensitive to suspicious tracks and was more likely to classify any position
track as suspicious. It was shown in this figure that the number of false negative errors
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decreased for the DLDF and LDF classification methods as P[H1] increased. As stated
earlier, the QDF and Mahalanobis classification methods both had PM rates of 25% and
10% respectively during the entire sweep of P[H1].
Figure 4.13 illustrates the false positive error rates PF of the four classification
methods for the P[H1] sweep. wcell was set to 918 feet.
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Figure 4.13: PF Performance for P[H1] Sweep: wcell = 918 feet.
The QDF classification method had the lowest average PF value: 33.33%. This
method had a PF value of 30% at the beginning of the sweep. The PF rate increased to 40%
when P[H1] was 0.8 and remained there for the rest of the sweep. The ideal P[H1] range
for this method was 0.5 to 0.75. When P[H1] was within this range, the QDF method had a
false negative error rate of 25% (Figure 4.12), and a false positive error rate of 30%. 25%
of suspicious position tracks in the database were incorrectly classified as non-suspicious,
and 30% of non-suspicious tracks in the database were incorrectly classified as suspicious.
The LDF classification method had the next best average PF rate: 47.78%. The PF
rate for this method increased steeply when P[H1] increased from 0.6 to 0.7. When P[H1]
was 0.9, the LDF method had a 100% false alarm rate. The DLDF classification method
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had an average PF rate of 52.22%. The PF rate for this method increased steeply when
P[H1] increased from 0.55 to 0.7. When P[H1] was 0.9, the DLDF method had a 100%
false alarm rate.
The Mahalanobis classification method had the worst average PF rate: 100%. The
Mahalanobis method remained at 100% for the entire sweep. It consistently classified all
of the non-suspicious tracks in the database as suspicious during the sweep. The standard
deviation of the PF rates for the LDF, DLDF and QDF classification methods were greater
than the standard deviation PM rates for the P[H1] sweep. The Mahalanobis method had
PM and PF standard deviations of 0% for this second P[H1] sweep.
It was expected that the PF rates for all classification methods would increase as P[H1]
approached 0.9 during the sweep. As P[H1] increased, the classifier became more sensitive
to suspicious tracks and was more likely to classify any position track as suspicious. It
was shown in Figure 4.13 that the number of false positive errors increased for all of the
classification methods as P[H1] increased except the Mahalanobis method. The quantitative
results for the this P[H1] sweep with wcell set to 918 feet are summarized in Table 4.5.
Statistics LDF DLDF QDF Mahalanobis
Average Accuracy (%) 58.08 61.11 71.21 50.00
Standard Deviation of Accuracy (%) 14.33 6.86 2.27 0
Average PM (%) 37.04 27.78 25.00 8.33
PM Standard Deviation (%) 7.35 20.41 0 0
Average PF (%) 47.78 52.22 33.33 100
PF Standard Deviation (%) 36.67 38.33 5.00 0
Table 4.5: Classifier Statistics for P[H1] Sweep: wcell = 918 feet.
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Classifier statistics for the P[H1] parameter sweep of two different grid resolutions
were presented and discussed in this subsection. wcell was set to 270 feet for the first sweep
and 918 feet for the second sweep. The next subsection presents and analyzes ROC curves
generated using the PF and PM data from the P[H1] sweeps at these two grid resolutions.
4.2.3 ROC Curve Analysis
This subsection used PF and PM data to calculate best fit ROC curves for the four
classification methods. First, P[H1] was swept from 0.0 to 1.0 in 0.05 increments in order
to generate the largest number of unique PF-PM data pairs. This parameter sweep resulted
in 21 pairs of PF and PM data. In some cases, the PF and PM data pairs had one or both
values in the pair that were identical to one or both values in a different data pair. In chapter
II, it was shown in Equation (2.16) that the PD rate could be determined if the PM rate was
known.
PD = 1 − PM (4.1)
PD data was generated using this equation. The PF and PD data points were then plotted
in the x-y coordinate format (PF , PD). This process was repeated for all four classification
methods. The MATLAB® command polyfit was used to generate best-fit curves from the
PF and PD data for each classification method. Through trial and error, the most appropriate
polynomial degree was chosen for each classification method’s best fit curve through the
data points.
Figure 4.14 shows the PF and PD data points and corresponding best fit curves for
each of the classification methods when wcell was set to 270 feet.
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Figure 4.14: PD vs. PF Data Points and Best Fit ROC Curves: wcell = 270 feet.
There were 13 unique PF-PD data points for the LDF classification method that were
used to generate the ROC curve. A polynomial of degree four was the most appropriate
for the PF-PD data points. The ROC curve for the LDF method was concave-down. There
were 15 unique PF-PD data points for the DLDF classification method that were used to
generate the ROC curve. A polynomial of degree two was the most appropriate for the
PF-PD data points. The ROC curve for the DLDF method was also concave-down.
There were seven unique PF-PD data points for the QDF classification method that
were used to generate the ROC curve. A polynomial of degree four was the most
appropriate for the PF-PD data points. The ROC curve for the QDF method was concave-
down. There was no curve generated for the Mahalanobis classification method because
87
this method operated at only one PF-PD data point. The data point for this grid resolution
configuration was (0.5, 1).
Figure 4.15 shows the best fit curves for each of the classification methods with the
random guess line displayed when wcell was set to 270 feet.
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Figure 4.15: Best Fit ROC Curves: wcell = 270 feet.
The three generated ROC curves and Mahalanobis point resided above the random
guess line for the entire range of PF . The QDF classification method had the most efficient
ROC curve. The point on the curve where this classification method performed the best was
at the PF-PD coordinates (0.1, 1). The method had a PD of 100% and a PF of only 10%.
At this point on the curve, the QDF method classified every suspicious track as suspicious,
and only 10% of non-suspicious tracks were classified as suspicious.
The Mahalanobis method operated at only one PF-PD data point. This point was at
the PF-PD coordinates (0.5, 1). At this point, the classification method had a PD of 100%
and a PF of 50%. The method classified every suspicious track as suspicious and 50% or
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half of the non-suspicious tracks as suspicious. While this point was not as accurate as the
(0.1, 1) point on the QDF ROC curve, it was still above the random guess line.
The LDF classification method’s best fit ROC curve was not as ideal as the QDF
method’s curve but was still above the random guess lines for the entire range of PF . The
method achieved a PD rate of about 0.77 when PF was 0.2, and a PD of about 0.92 when
PF was 0.40. The DLDF classification method’s best fit ROC curve also was not as ideal as
the QDF method’s curve but was still above the random guess lines for all PF values. The
method achieved a PD rate of about 0.75 when PF was 0.4, and a PD of 0.9 when PF was
0.46.
Figure 4.16 shows the PF and PD data points and corresponding best fit curves for
each of the classification methods when wcell was set to 918 feet.
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Figure 4.16: PD vs. PF Data Points and Best Fit ROC Curves: wcell = 918 feet.
There were 15 unique PF-PD data points for the LDF classification method that were
used to generate the ROC curve. A polynomial of degree six was the most appropriate for
the PF-PD data points. The ROC curve for the LDF method was concave-down. There
were 12 unique PF-PD data points for the DLDF classification method that were used to
generate its ROC curve. A polynomial of degree four was the most appropriate for the
PF-PD data points. The ROC curve for the DLDF method was also concave-down.
There were five unique PF-PD data points for the QDF classification method that were
used to generate the ROC curve. A polynomial of degree four was the most appropriate for
the PF-PD data points. The ROC curve for the QDF method was also concave-down
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es. There was again no curve generated for the Mahalanobis classification method
because this method operated at only one PF-PD data point. The data point for this grid
resolution configuration was (1, 0.92).
Figure 4.17 shows the best fit curves for each of the classification methods with the
random guess line when wcell was set to 918 feet.
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Figure 4.17: Best Fit ROC Curves: wcell = 918 feet.
The best fit ROC curve for the QDF classification method at this grid configuration
was the only curve that did not pass under the random guess line for the entire range of PF .
The best fit ROC curves for the LDF and DLDF classification methods eventually passed
under the random guess line as PF increased from 0 to 1. The Mahalanobis data point also
resided under the random guess line.
The QDF classification method was not as ideal for this set of PF-PD data compared
to the grid configuration when wcell was set to 270 feet. When PF was 0.2, PD was about
0.70. When PF was 0.4, PD for the QDF method only increased to 0.75. It can be asserted
that the most ideal point on the curve was (0.2, 0.70). This point on the curve was above
the random guess line.
93
The DLDF classification method did not perform as well for this set of PF-PD data
compared to when wcell was set to 270 feet. When PF was 0.2, PD was about 0.5. When PF
was 0.6, PD for this method was about to 0.8. It can be asserted that the most ideal point
on the curve was (0.4, 0.65). This point on the curve was still above the random guess line.
The LDF classification method also did not perform as well for this set of PF-PD data
compared to when wcell was set to 270 feet. The curve achieved a PD value of about 0.65
relatively early, when PF was was 0.2. As PF increased, PD for this method remained about
0.65 as PF approached 1. It passed under the random guess line when PF was 0.66. It can
be asserted that the most ideal point on the curve was (0.3, 0.66). This point on the curve
was still above the random guess line.
Finally, the Mahalanobis method again operated at only one PD vs. PF point on the
figure. This point was at the coordinates (1, 0.92) and was located under the random guess
line. At this point, the classification method had a PD of 92% and a PF of 100%. The
method incorrectly classified every non-suspicious track in the database as suspicious, and
correctly classified 91.67 % or almost all suspicious tracks in the database as suspicious.
The QDF classification method had the most accurate best fit ROC curve for this grid
resolution configuration. At the point where it was most efficient, about 70% of suspicious
tracks were correctly classified as suspicious while only 20% of non-suspicious tracks were
incorrectly classified as suspicious.
The results of the generated PF and PD data and best-fit ROC curves when wcell was
set to 270 and 918 feet were presented and analyzed in this subsection. PF and PM
data were generated for each classification method from a P[H1] parameter sweep from
0 to 1. PD data for each method was then calculated and the PF-PD data points were
plotted. Polynomial functions that represented best fit ROC curves were fit to the data
points using trial and error. The best fit ROC curve for each classification method for both
grid resolution configurations were presented and analyzed.
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4.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the results that were attained in this research. First, four
cross-sectional feature generation data plots were presented and discussed in section 4.1.
Then, the classifier results and statistics were presented in section 4.2. This subsection
first presented the classifier results for the grid resolution sweep. As emphasized in
subsection 4.2.1, the QDF classification method outperformed the other three classification
methods in overall accuracy. Then, two P[H1] sweeps were conducted for wcell values of
270 and 918 feet. Finally, PF-PD data points were generated and calculated from a P[H1]
sweep from 0 to 1 and best fit ROC curves were applied to the data in subsection 4.2.3.
This chapter communicated that the QDF classification method outperformed the other
classification methods used in this research. This method performed the best when the grid
cell width wcell was set to 270 feet. At this grid resolution, the QDF accuracy was 95.45%
when it classified the 22 position tracks one at a time. The average PM rate during the P[H1]
sweep for the QDF method at wcell = 270 feet was 0% and the average PF rate was 22.22%.
The lowest PM and PF rates for the QDF method were 10% and 0%, respectively. The prior
probabilities for the non-suspicious and suspicious classes (P[H0] and P[H1] respectively)
were both set to 0.5 or 50% class for this system configuration.
Chapter V is the final chapter and presents a summary and conclusion of this research.
Additionally, a future work section is included which outlines areas of future research that
can be conducted.
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V. Summary, Conclusions and Future Work
T his chapter summarizes this thesis and the results produced by it. It also detailssignificant conclusions drawn from the research and areas for future work.
5.1 Summary
The purpose of this research was to determine the feasibility of an RF emitter tracking
and intent assessment as a means for enhanced physical security of a military installation.
Chapter I introduced a brief background on this research area and included the problem
statement, the scope and application of the research, the research objectives, equipment
needed and the motivation for this thesis.
A more detailed background of source localization and pattern recognition concepts
were provided in chapter II. Additionally, current research thrusts pertaining to employing
pattern recognition techniques within a WSN to perform anomaly detection both in the
physical and cyber domains were discussed. Chapter III communicated the methodologies
used in this research. The chapter covered the standard operation of the Magellan® Mobile
GPS unit, position track processing, feature generation from the position track database
and classification of the position tracks.
The results of the intent assessment were presented chapter IV. First, the discriminant
lines and curves for the four classification methods used in this research were plotted over
cross-sectional generated feature data. These figures displayed data for two features at a
time. The classifier statistics generated from two parameter sweeps were then presented.
The two parameters were the grid cell spacing parameter (wcell) and the suspicious class
prior probability (P[H1]). The classifier’s accuracy as well as PM and PF errors were
analyzed for both the grid resolution and P[H1] sweeps.
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Finally, best fit ROC curves were generated using the PF and PM data from the P[H1]
sweep. The PM rates was converted into PD rates and the data points were plotted in the
x-y coordinate plane. Best fit ROC curves were generated to fit the PF and PD data for each
of the four classification methods. The best fit ROC curves for each classification method
were analyzed and compared.
5.2 Conclusions
This research has shown that it is possible to correctly classify position tracks as non-
suspicious or suspicious using the feature data generated from them. In this research, data
from five different features was generated for each position track. However, a position
track can be classified as non-suspicious or suspicious using just one set of feature data.
As the number of features used in the feature generation processes increased, the classifier
accuracy also increased.
Chapter IV explained that the QDF classification method outperformed the other
classification methods used in this research. This method performed the best when the grid
cell width wcell was set to 270 feet. At this grid resolution, the QDF accuracy was 95.45%
when it classified the 22 position tracks one at a time. The average PM rate during the P[H1]
sweep for the QDF method at wcell = 270 feet was 0% and the average PF rate was 22.22%.
The lowest PM and PF rates for the QDF method were 10% and 0%, respectively. The prior
probabilities for the non-suspicious and suspicious classes (P[H0] and P[H1] respectively)
were both set to 0.5 or 50% class for this system configuration.
This research confirms the feasibility and practicality of implementing an RF emitter
tracking and intent assessment for a military installation with the design to improve
physical security. The data and results that were produced by this research and
communicated in chapter IV show that accurate feature data can be generated from position
tracks and passed to a classifier using the QDF classification method to determine if the
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behavior is suspicious or non-suspicious. The next section discusses areas for future work
and research pertaining to this thesis.
5.3 Future Work
There are many areas that future work can be conducted in this research field. The
following subsections communicate how further advancements can be realized through
additional research.
5.3.1 Implementing Accurate Real-time Geolocation with TelosB Motes
A grid of wireless Memsic® TelosB sensors that geolocate an emitter in motion can
replace the requirement for collecting position tracks with the GPS unit for the position
track database. The base station would collect the RSS values from each sensor and pass
a complete RSS data set in real-time to an estimation algorithm. One possible algorithm is
the MLE. A position track could then be created of the x-y position estimates produced by
the estimator. The feature generation and classification processes described in chapters II
and III of this thesis could be applied in the same manner.
5.3.2 Tracking Multiple Emitters Simultaneously in a WSN
Another specific area that can be researched is the ability to simultaneously track
multiple emitters in real-time. For this to be possible, the intent assessment system must
include functionality to differentiate one emitter from another. The system would keep
track of differences in communication protocol or signal structure between two or more
transmitters. One example of a possible distinguisher for different RF devices is the Media
Access Control (MAC) address.
The RSS values from the sensors would be separated into exclusive RSS data sets
for each emitter in the network. A position estimator would input the data sets separately
in order to produce device-specific x-y position estimates. The position tracks created
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from geolocating multiple emitters would also be processed separately. Mutually exclusive
feature data would be generated separately for each emitter’s position track.
Each emitter in the WSN would be classified as suspicious or non-suspicious. If any
one or combination of multiple emitters being tracked and monitored in the network were
flagged as suspicious, the military installation security personnel would be notified.
5.3.3 Increasing the Size of the WSN
Increasing the size of the data collect area used for this research (defined by the
overhead image presented in chapter III) would allow for additional landmark features to
be employed in the classification process. Additionally, position tracks collected in the new
area would have increased variability and diversity which would create broader data sets
after the feature generation process.
5.3.4 Increasing the Size of the Position Track Database
Collecting more position tracks within the area defined by the overhead satellite image
would increase the size of the position track database. Expanding the database would
increase the training data set used by the classifier when it classifies an unknown track
using the LOOCV method.
Increasing the number of position tracks in the database would also increase the
resolution of the PF and PD data presented in chapter IV. In this research the resolution
was only 0.1 because the database used in this research was comprised of only 10
non-suspicious and 12 suspicious tracks. As the number of position tracks in the
database increases, the standard deviation of PF would decrease, effectively increasing the
confidence of the data.
5.3.5 Improving Feature Generation
The methods for generating feature data can be improved. Research can be conducted
to improve the five existing feature generation algorithms discussed in chapter III, and also
to create new features that can be used for classification.
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A more sophisticated repetition algorithm can be implemented to generate more
accurate repetition feature data. The algorithm would record the maximum euclidean
distance that the position track reached before returning to a particular grid cell.
Additionally, the length of time (in time-stamps) that the track remains from a particular
grid cell can be recorded.
An extensive investigation can be performed to determine the complexity and
efficiencies of the dwell and repetition feature algorithms. Specifically, the study can
determine how the grid resolution affects the accuracy of the feature data generated by
these two algorithms and the required processing-times on a micro-level.
An algorithm can be developed using the grid described in chapter III to determine the
direction that an emitter is traveling. This can be accomplished by recording the grid cell
that the emitter currently resides in, and then recording the adjacent or corner grid cell that
the emitter moves to when it leaves the current cell. With this information, a direction can
determined that the emitter is traveling. This direction would be one of the four cardinal or
four intermediate directions: north, east, west, south, north-east, etc.
The algorithm would then record the number of times that the emitter in motion
changed its direction. Suspicious tracks generally possess more direction changes than
non-suspicious tracks do. Therefore, this direction feature algorithm would assign a high
score pertaining to suspicious activity for a position track that changed direction frequently.
A low score would be assigned to a track that changed its direction minimally.
The velocity of a position track can be calculated using a Kalman filter. The filter will
observe each position estimate over time and take the time derivative of the change in x-y
position to determine the instantaneous velocity.
Additionally, more landmark features can be employed in the future. The buildings
that comprise AFIT can be used as landmark features. Specifically, the exterior doors of
the buildings can be set as non-suspicious in the landmark distance pixel map, and the rest
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of the perimeters can be set as suspicious. In this manner, the landmark feature algorithm
for the buildings will attribute a low score corresponding to non-suspicious activity for
position tracks that come within close proximity to the doors, and subsequently a high score
corresponding to suspicious activity when position tracks come within close proximity to
a building’s exterior wall or window.
Other landmark features that can be incorporated into the classifier are the WPAFB
Area B perimeter fence and additional high-valued areas such as other buildings and power
substations. With the addition of these new features, the accuracy of the classifier would
improve.
5.3.6 Using Different Classification Methods
Different classification methods can be implemented in MATLAB® for the intent
classifier. The results produced by these new methods can be incorporated with the results
presented in chapter IV to create a more comprehensive view of the intent assessment
performance. Radial Basis Functions (RBFs) and NNs can be implemented to perform
position track classification. Different types of cross validation can be performed on the
data collected in this research. The LOOCV method was the only method employed in this
thesis. Two-fold cross validation is one type of cross validation that can be implemented.
5.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter summarized this thesis and the results produced by it. Significant
conclusions drawn from the research and areas for future work were presented.
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Appendix: Detailed Classifier Results
Position Track # Class
1 Suspicious
2 Suspicious
3 Suspicious
4 Non-Suspicious
5 Non-Suspicious
6 Non-Suspicious
7 Non-Suspicious
8 Suspicious
9 Suspicious
10 Suspicious
11 Non-Suspicious
12 Suspicious
13 Non-Suspicious
14 Non-Suspicious
15 Suspicious
16 Non-Suspicious
17 Suspicious
18 Non-Suspicious
19 Suspicious
20 Suspicious
Table A.1: Classifier Database
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Position Track # Class
21 Non-Suspicious
22 Suspicious
Table A.2: Classifier Database
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Figure A.1: Track 1 on Overhead Imagery.
103
x (feet)
y 
(fe
et)
Start
End
0 500 1000 1500 2000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Figure A.2: Track 2 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.3: Track 3 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.4: Track 4 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.5: Track 5 on Overhead Imagery.
105
x (feet)
y 
(fe
et)
Start
End
0 500 1000 1500 2000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Figure A.6: Track 6 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.7: Track 7 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.8: Track 8 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.9: Track 9 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.10: Track 10 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.11: Track 11 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.12: Track 12 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.13: Track 13 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.14: Track 14 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.15: Track 15 on Overhead Imagery.
110
x (feet)
y 
(fe
et)
Start
End
0 500 1000 1500 2000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Figure A.16: Track 16 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.17: Track 17 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.18: Track 18 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.19: Track 19 on Overhead Imagery.
112
x (feet)
y 
(fe
et)
Start
End
0 500 1000 1500 2000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Figure A.20: Track 20 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.21: Track 21 on Overhead Imagery.
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Figure A.22: Track 22 on Overhead Imagery.
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